

**UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME [COUNTRY]**  
**SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT & RECOMMENDED MITIGATION MEASURES**  
**FOR**  
**THE [OFFICE] IN [DUTY STATION] – [COUNTRY]**

**DATE OF SURVEY: [DAY-MONTH-YEAR]**

**DATE OF REPORT: [DAY-MONTH-YEAR]**

**REPORT BY: [NAME UN SECURITY ADVISOR UNDSS]**

## I. Summary

Based on the UNDP [Country] request, UNDSS SO Aden developed this Security-Risk Assessment (SRA) considering the current security situation in [Duty Station] to identify the risk level at this office and accordingly set the mitigation measures which will contribute to reduce the risk level.

The purpose of this SRA is to determine the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the proposed UNDP Office in [Duty Station] - located at XYZ, in relation to current threats and to give advice and make recommendations to enable effective mitigation.

Information for this SRA was gathered from the country SRA and various sources including official channels of Host Country Security liaison as well as the physical inspection to the project site on [Date].

## II. UNDP Program Assessment in [Duty Station]

### General

UNDP plans to have 2 projects in [Duty Station], the first project aim is ABC, while the second project aims to DEF. In order to facilitate recovery of the local economic and social structures, the project will support government's coordination efforts by providing technical expertise and enhancing its coordination capacity required for recovery. Since 75% of the affected population is comprised of farmers, rehabilitation of livelihood through community-based approach will be a key component; the fund of these projects is US\$xxx million.

### UNDP Staffing

Since 2009 UNDP has plans to deploy staff and establish an office in [Duty Station], which will also need to be MOSS compliant.

### CO Staff

[INSERT TABLE]

### Program Criticality

Facilitate recovery of the local economic and social structures as well as early recovery project for the Livelihoods Sector of the Flood Affected Areas. Therefore, the program will receive a wide appreciation and acceptance by the local population because the project activities are designed to reduce poverty and to lay the foundation for the long-term development of the affected areas.

### III. General Assessment

[Duty Station] is located in XYZ, under the circumstance; [Duty Station] is a relatively secure due to the existence of committed security forces deployed by Government of XYZ. The general security arrangements in terms of number of police stations/forces available, as well as the fire department around the immediate area of the UNDP 'proposed' office is considered satisfactory. The emergency response unit of [Duty Station] Police Department can also cover the complete area with a number of Mobile Police Teams. The phone number for the Police/Fire Emergency Unit is xxxx.

The [Area] is known for [123 Group] presence and their aim to spread terrorism in the area in support of local opposition to the central government. The ideas of an independent state are still popular in the area. Latest disturbances in support of succession of the [Area] from [Area] can be employed by [123 Group] in attempt to further destabilize the authority of the central government in the [Area].

*15 Mar 2009* – A Suicide Bomb attack on a tourist group visiting [Area] resulted in the death of xxxx tourists and injuring xxx, both GHI and JKL nationals.

*30 May 2009* – [123 Group] released the 9th issue of Sada Al-Malahem magazine. There, [123 Group] claimed the responsibility for the attacks on JKL tourists and their stated justification allegedly relating to the JKL involvement in other countries. The leader of [123 Group] also warned foreigners to refrain from entering the [Area]. The latest edition also contained a link to 194 page e-book endorsed by XXX comprising the most direct and extreme rhetoric against the UN indoctrinating the readers that the UN is one of greatest tyrants of this age.

*On 3 Nov 2009* – Head of political security and head of general security were killed in an armed ambush while they were in their vehicle.

### IV. General Description of the Area and Building

#### [Insert GPS Coordinates]

The proposed UNDP Office address is ABC Street of [Area] and is located in a residential area named DEF, [Duty Station].

- a) With reference to the map of [Duty Station], the proposed UNDP office is considered to be located in a 'moderately' safe area compared to other areas of the city, however, awareness of police, military, fire and medical support facilities is strongly advised. The proposed office is close to [Duty Station] International Airport to the north.
  - From the North: ABC Street facing the northern direction of the building. There is xxx meters "stand-off distance"

- Stand-off Distance (SOD) between the main street (ABC Street) and the main entrance of the office is xxx meters. (Photo #1)
- From the South: A private residence located at the southern site of the office, a 3-meter high wall separates the office from the neighborhood, while there is insufficient SOD to the southern rear area and the neighboring house. (Photo #2)
- From the East: the eastern area of the building is divided into 2 parts, at the rear part there is a small piece of land - sufficient SOD - to south east side of the building and northern side of the neighboring house (Photo #3), a 3-meter high wall separates the office from the plot of land. (Photo #4), emergency exit door (Photo #5).
- From the West: there is insufficient SOD to the side of the building and a 1.5-meter high wall, separates the building from the adjacent empty plot of land. Therefore, there is sufficient SOD between the wall and the main western road, (Photos # 6 & 7).

Note 1: The owner promised to rise of the concrete 1.5-meter high wall to 3 meters.

Note 2: There is sufficient SOD to the entrance, and the western side of the building. There is insufficient SOD to the northern wall (front area), southern (back area) and the eastern area. However, the nature of the area as well as the surrounding buildings and lands, ensure the protection of the building after implementing the recommended mitigation measures.

- b) The proposed office is a stand-alone building, xxxx-story villa with xxx bedrooms, surrounded with a perimeter concrete wall of approx 1.5 to 3 meters, with 2 steel gates at the main entrance for cars, as well as a small door at the right side of the main entrance for the entry and egress of staff and visitors.
- c) The building has a secure parking lot with sufficient space for cars.
- d) The building is made of solid reinforced concrete blocks and stones, firm wood and metal doors, and glass windows.
- e) There are 2 metal doors at the main entrance (Photo # 8).
- f) There is a CCTV/Security camera system that satisfactory covers the front left/rights and rear sides of the building.
- g) There is an existing alarm system.
- h) There is an adequate security lighting system around the building.
- i) There is no a 'stand-by3 generator at present.
- j) There are smoke & carbon dioxide detectors in place throughout the proposed office.
- k) There is no Shatter Resistance Film (SRF) applied to any of the building's windows.
- l) There is no building evacuation plan.
- m) There is no Guardhouse.
- n) There is no reception area at the entrance.
- o) General Physical Security Measures that have been taken into account outside of the proposed UNDP project office in **[Duty Station]** are as follows:
  - i. Limited Security Lighting is established on the road to the front of the building.

- ii. The building has an existing exit and entry gates.
- iii. As stated above, the building has adequate SOD to the front and left of the building.
- iv. The building has a solid perimeter wall of 1.5 - 3 meters, which is to be further enhanced by the owner and UNDP before signing of the contract.

## V. Threat Matrix

Threat Assessment (TA)		Programme Assessment (PA)		Vulnerability Assessment (VA)		Risk Analysis			Recommendations	
Threat	Situation	Location	Activity	Weakness	Strengths	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level (current)	Mitigating Measures	Residual Risk Level (future)
<b>Terrorism</b>  Terrorist attack by VBIED against UN at UNDP premises in ██████	██████ is a relatively secure due to the existence of committed security forces deployed by GOY especially for ██████ area.  The general security arrangements in terms of number of police stations and the forces available around the immediate area of the 'proposed' office are considered satisfactory.  The emergency response unit of ██████ Police Department can also cover the complete area with a number of Mobile Police Teams.  There is no history of VBIED attack in ██████. However a number of VBIED attacks were executed in Yemen including international targets.  VBIED attack against UNDP office in ██████ cannot be ruled out.	• The proposed premise is located in a residential area of ██████ City, the national security and the political security offices are located at the surrounding area of the proposed UNDP project office.	- UN Staff mainly will be present weekdays (Sat. - Wed, from 08:00-16:00hrs; Thurs.-Fri. = Weekend)  - Initial number of staff to work from the office is 21 (3 international and 18 National staff).  - The office is not expected to receive high number of visitor.  - Parking lot inside the office.  - Four UNDP 4Wd vehicles	- High profile office The house is located in a residential area which does not provide adequate stand-off distance between the building and neighbors at the Southern and the eastern and part of front side.  - UN staff members  - Neither HG armed guards or contractual guards assigned at proposed office.  - SRF is not fitted to Windows and glass partitions.  - There is no access control room  - there is no HESCO - Jersey pr metal barriers in place	- The area is monitored by ██████ security as it's next to an important/vital government's facility. (National security and political security).  There is enough standoff between the main street and the main entrance of the office from the northern and the western side.	Moderately likely	Mode rate	Medium	1. Establishing an access control room.  2. Install SRF on all windows and glass partition.  3. Hire contractual guards and coordinate with the HG government in order to provide 2 armored guards per shift.  4. A Jersey barriers should be established at the beginning of the entrance to slow down the cars before the metal barriers.  5. A HESCO bastion wall should be procured and be located adjacent, inside, of the western perimeter wall.  Complementary: 1. Digital CCTV. 2. X-Ray machine at the access control room	LOW

<b>Terrorism</b> Terrorist attack by PBED against UNDP premises in [redacted]	On 15 Mar 2009 – A Suicide Bomb attack on [redacted] Tourist group visiting [redacted].  Such attack against UN cannot be ruled out.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Neither HG armed guards or contractual guards assigned at proposed office.</li> <li>- SRF is not fitted to Windows and glass partitions.</li> <li>- No access control in place.</li> <li>- No CCTV in place</li> <li>- No light system in place</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Area is monitored by [redacted] security as it's next to an important/vital government's facility.</li> <li>- Emergency Exit is located at the rear side of the house.</li> </ul> <p>There is enough space to establish a strong access control room.</p>	likely	Mode rate	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Install SRF on all windows and glass partition.</li> <li>- Enhance the perimeter walls to be 3 m. and install razor wire on top.</li> <li>- Hire contractual guards to operate the entrance and to be equipped with metal detector and necessary communication tools.</li> <li>- Liaise with [redacted] to provide armed guard at the office.</li> <li>- Appropriate access control measures based on size and location of premises.</li> <li>- All visitors and S\I and their belongings must be subject to research.</li> <li>- An X-ray walk-through machine</li> <li>- Guard force 'intercom' to be on the main entry point.</li> <li>- Digital CCTV</li> <li>- Light system</li> <li>- Electronic access control system</li> </ul>	Medium
<b>Terrorism</b>  Threat of mail / package bombs against UN locations and staff	In Oct'08 a parcel bomb detonated at GOY Ministry in [redacted]. The incident caused one death and one injury. [redacted] claimed responsibility.  Similar attacks against UN cannot be ruled out.		<b>UN offices receive mail/packages in the following manner:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mail is delivered by Official Postal service including UN pouch</li> <li>- Mail is internally delivered to the respective UN staff.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hiring the armed guards and UN manners in receiving mail/packages has not been implemented yet.</li> <li>- Lack of adequate training for contractual security companies.</li> </ul>	<p>There is enough space to establish a strong access control room.</p>	Moderately likely	Mode rate	Medium	<p>In Addition to the implementation measures mentioned above:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Comply with UN offices manners in terms of receiving mail/Packages</li> <li>- Guards and staff should be aware on non-acceptance of packages from unknown persons</li> </ul> <p>UNDSS could provide training for [redacted] armed guards and contractual guards.</p>	Low

<p><b>Criminality</b></p> <p>Threat of UN office break-ins at night and working hours</p>	<p>• Recently no serious break-ins or thefts have been reported at UN offices. For long time there was history of larceny in UN offices.</p>	<p>Assets which are planned to be utilized are mainly offices furnishes and electronic equipments such as computers, printers, etc. As well as four 4WD UNDP vehicle</p>	<p>- Neither armed guards or contractual guards assigned at proposed office.</p> <p>- The lighting system (exterior &amp; interior) is not sufficient.</p> <p>- Some widows on the ground and first floor are not fitted with security grills.</p> <p>- Access control system is not in place.</p> <p>- No razor wire installed on top of the perimeter's walls.</p> <p>- the perimeter wall at the west and the front side need to be rise up to 3 m.</p>	<p>- Majority of Windows are fitted with security grills.</p> <p>- Building's main door and emergency doors are solid metallic doors.</p>	<p>Moderately Likely</p>	<p>Moderate</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>In Addition to the mitigation measures mentioned above:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Light bulbs are recommended to enhance the lighting system and to cover all the blind spots.</li> <li>- Fit security grills to the uncovered widows</li> <li>- Contracted security must be instructed to first identify and announce the visitor and only after initiate access control procedure.</li> </ul>	<p>Low</p>
<p><b>Civil Unrest</b></p> <p>Injuries/ Damages caused by Demonstrations / riots / Protests against UN locations</p>	<p>Demonstrations are held in front of or in the vicinity of UN premises. Civil unrest in [redacted] proved to be lethal and on a large scale.</p> <p>[redacted] is a relatively secure due to the existence of committed security forces deployed by Government of [redacted] especially for [redacted] area and the foreign communities. The general security arrangements in terms of number of police stations and the forces available around the immediate area of the 'proposed'</p>	<p>UN Staff mainly present weekdays (Sat. - Wed. from 08:00-16:00hrs; Thurs.-Fri. = Weekend)</p> <p>- Initial number of staff to work from the office is [redacted] UN staff members</p> <p>- The office is not expected to receive</p>	<p>- Building evacuation plan is not available.</p> <p>- No VHF, HF, Satellite phone, or Landline are available at the proposed office. The only communication means at the premises mobile phones of staff members which always been cut during riots and demonstrations</p>	<p>- Effective alerting system, active DSS radio room that is operational 24/7 and covering the southern Governorates in [redacted]</p> <p>- Emergency response unit of [redacted] Police Department can also cover the complete area with a number of Mobile Police Teams moderately satisfactory.</p> <p>- Emergency exit door is located at the rear side of the office.</p>	<p>Moderately Likely</p>	<p>Moderate</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>In addition to above mitigation measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- An office sized medical kit is to be made available at the office for emergency reasons.</li> <li>-Bunker/reinforced room to be identified and configured,</li> <li>- Telephone line, Satellite phone and VHF (at least on handset to be given to S/Ms during working hours) to be in place and operational.</li> <li>- Prepare written evacuation plan for the building and train S/Ms.</li> </ul>	<p>Low</p>

	office are considered satisfactory. The emergency response unit of [REDACTED] Police Department can also cover the complete area with a number of Mobile Police Team.		high number of visitor, - Parking lot inside the office, - 4 rented car							
<b>Hazards</b>  Threat of fire at UN locations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Due to the lasting economic difficulties and the lack of capacity from the authorities' side to regulate and monitor buildings safety measures in conjunction with the poor maintenance of the old buildings and ad hoc electric wiring all over the [REDACTED] city, represents a serious risk of accidental fire</li> <li>- Delay in fire department response to the fire incidents</li> <li>- There are 2 roads approach the building from the front and right).</li> </ul>		<p>UN staff mainly present weekdays (Sat. - Wedn. From 08:00-16:00hrs; Thurs.-Fri. = Weekend)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The proposed building approximately 30 years old.</li> <li>- The Parking is adjacent to east side of the premise. Weekdays approx. 4 cars park there.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The proposed building approximately 30 years of construction and poorly maintained (Internal part).</li> <li>- The electrical wiring inside and outside the property looks suspect and may trigger an electric shot.</li> <li>- No smoke detectors</li> <li>- Fire extinguishers aren't available</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emergency doors are available.</li> <li>- There are 2 roads approach the building from the front and the east).</li> </ul>	Moderately Likely	Mode rate	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security Guards to be trained to react promptly to a fire alert.</li> <li>- All interior wiring to be inspected and renewed as necessary</li> <li>- Fire extinguishers to be made available, in consultation with fire experts.</li> <li>- Smoke/heat detectors to be installed on every Offices.</li> <li>- First aid kit</li> <li>- Provide first-aid and fire safety training for all staff.</li> <li>- Building evacuation plan to be prepared.</li> <li>Periodic Fire Inspections at the office to check conditions of wiring and safety preparedness.</li> </ul>	Low



## VI. Recommendations

From a security and safety stance, the following measure that should be initiated as soon as possible are recommended by UNDSS Yemen (as per CMOSS) for the proposed UNDP project office in **[Duty Station]** are as follows:

1. Security guards: 12 Contractual Guards to be hired, from a known local security firm, to secure the building 24/7; i.e. 4 guards per each 8-hour shift. Proper sentry box to be placed behind the main gate, inside the perimeter wall
2. Government support: Liaise/Request [Duty Station] Security/Department to permanently post armed guards, i.e. 2 guards per each 8-hour shift. A proper sentry box to be placed at the main gate, outside the perimeter wall, additionally a Mobile Quick Reaction (MQR) and Security Metal/jersey barriers
3. Access control: Proper reception and inspection room to be established; screening procedures to be drafted and strictly implemented
4. Handheld metal detectors and inspection mirrors are mandatory for the guard-force at the accesses control
5. The main entrance gate of the office should be replaced/reinforced with solid steel. Two pylons should be installed at each side of the main gate to further reinforce the gate anti-ram capability
6. The main entrance door located at the right side of the main gate to be used as access control; electronic access control system should be installed
7. X-Ray machine to be installed at the access control room
8. Walk-through x-ray machine to be installed at the access control room
9. Guard force 'intercom' at the main entry point is strongly recommended
10. Security lighting and power supply; light bulbs are recommended to enhance the lighting system and cover all the blind spots. Also external building 'security lighting' should be upgraded/established. An emergency power supply (generator) to be made available at the office premises to guarantee continued operational services
11. Communications: Telephone line and VHF/HF system to be in place and operational as well as a satellite phone to be made available and operational
12. Safety: There should be at least one fire extinguisher for every 2 medium sized rooms.
13. Smoke/heat detectors to be installed.
14. An alarm system and CCTV type monitoring system should be installed to fully cover the rear, left, right and front sides of the building, as well as exit/entry area points and the front road left & right. Fire safety alarm system needs to be in place.
15. Written fire safety and building evacuation procedures should be in place, clearly promulgated and exercised quarterly
16. An office-sized medical kit is to be made available on the premises for emergency reasons

17. Razor wire to be installed on top of the perimeter walls, including the partitions between the neighbors dwelling and the office
18. Shatter Resistant Film (SRF) should be applied to all window/partition glass surfaces
19. Window Security Grills are required on all 'lower level' windows
20. A HESCO bastion wall should reinforce the inside of the western perimeter wall. (Please see Photo #6)

Please note that the premises should be subjected to a Blast Assessment - which may imply additional mitigating measures.

## VII. Conclusion

In conclusion, after the application of the recommended measures following the security survey conducted by UNDSS [Country], and as per the CMOSS validated by the country SMT, the proposed UNDP office may be considered as a secure and ready for occupancy.

Prepared by: Mr. XXXX - UNDSS FSCO [Area].

Approved by: Mr. YYYY - UNDSS CSA

## Annex A



Photo # 1 - Around 100 meter SOD to road and the main entrance



Photo # 2 - Southern - the rear of the building



Photo# 3 – piece of land between the building and the eastern neighbor



Photo # 4 - the second part of the Western



Photo # 5 - Emergency Exit ( East)



Photo #6 – the western wall perimeter - HESCO required



Photo #7 – an empty piece of land at the western side of the office – view at the western road.




Photo # 8 - two steel gates at the main entrance



Photo # 9 – the main door at the right side of the main entrance to the building be used as staff and visitors entrance/exit at the daily bases and this will lead to the access control room (photo # 11)



Photo # 10 - The premiter wall is located at front (northern side) of the bulding – to be rised up to 3 miters




Photo # 11 - Rest rooms at the main entrance – need to be rebuilt to be used as access control room, there is no other ulternative.




Photo # 12 - Eastern viwe for the bulding



Photo # 13 – eastern view of the building



Photo #14 – viwe from outside the main gate to the main street ( [redacted] street)



Photo # 15 – front looking east – main street ( [redacted] Street)



Photo # 16 – front looking west - main street ( [redacted] Street)